Seat of Power:
‘The Passage of Power,’ Robert Caro’s New L.B.J. Book
By BILL CLINTON
Published: May 2, 2012
“The Passage of Power,” the fourth installment of Robert Caro’s
brilliant series on Lyndon Johnson, spans roughly five years, beginning
shortly before the 1960 presidential contest, including the Bay of Pigs,
the Cuban missile crisis and other seminal events of the Kennedy years,
and ending a few months after the awful afternoon in Dallas that
elevated L.B.J. to the presidency.
Among the most interesting and important episodes Caro chronicles are
those involving the new president’s ability to maneuver bills out of
legislative committees and onto the floor of the House and Senate for a
vote. One of those bills would later become the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
You don’t have to be a policy wonk to marvel at the political skill
L.B.J. wielded to resuscitate a bill that seemed doomed to never get a
vote on the floor of either chamber. Southern Democrats were masters at
bottling up legislation they hated, particularly bills expanding civil
rights for black Americans. Their skills at obstruction were so admired
that the newly sworn-in Johnson was firmly counseled by an ally against
using the political capital he’d inherited as a result of the
assassination on such a hopeless cause.
According to Caro, Johnson responded, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?”
This is the question every president must ask and answer. For Lyndon Johnson in the final weeks of 1963, the presidency was for
two things: passing a civil rights bill with teeth, to replace the much
weaker 1957 law he’d helped to pass as Senate majority leader, and
launching the War on Poverty. That neither of these causes was in fact
hopeless was clear possibly only to him, as few Americans in our history
have matched Johnson’s knowledge of how to move legislation, and
legislators.
It’s wonderful to watch Johnson’s confidence catch fire and spread to
the shellshocked survivors of the Kennedy administration as it dawned on
them that the man who was once Master of the Senate would now be a
chief executive with more ability to move legislation through the House
and Senate than just about any other president in history. Johnson’s
fire spread outward until it touched the entire country during his first
State of the Union address. The words were written by Kennedy’s
speechwriter Ted Sorensen, but their impact would be felt in the magic
L.B.J. worked over the next seven weeks.
Exactly how L.B.J. did it was perfectly captured later by Hubert
Humphrey — the man the president chose as his vote counter for the civil
rights bill and his Senate proxy to carve its passage.
Humphrey said Johnson “knew just how to get to me.”
In sparkling detail, Caro shows the new president’s genius for getting
to people — friends, foes and everyone in between — and how he used it
to achieve his goals. We’ve all seen the iconic photos of L.B.J. leaning
into a conversation, poking his thick finger into a confidant’s chest
or wrapping his long arm around a shoulder. At 6 foot 4, he towered over
most men, but even seated Johnson commanded from on high. Caro relates
how during a conversation about civil rights, he placed Roy Wilkins and
his N.A.A.C.P. entourage on one of the couches in the Oval Office, yet
still towered over them as he sat up close in his rocking chair. And he
didn’t need to be in the same room — he was great at manipulating,
cajoling and even bullying over the phone.
He knew just how to get to you, and he was relentless in doing it.
If you were a partisan, he’d call on your patriotism; if a
traditionalist, he’d make his proposal seem to be the Establishment
choice. His flattery was minutely detailed, finely tuned and perfectly
modulated. So was his bombast — whatever worked. L.B.J. didn’t kiss Sam
Rayburn’s ring, but his lips did press against his bald head. Harry Byrd
received deference and attention. When L.B.J. became president, he
finally had the power to match his political skills.
The other remarkable part of this volume covers the tribulation before
the triumphs: the lost campaign and the interminable years as vice
president, in which L.B.J.’s skills were stymied and his power was
negligible. He had little to do, less to say, and no defense against the
indignities the Kennedys’ inner circle heaped on him. The Master of the
Senate may have become its president, but in title only. He might have
agreed with his fellow Texan John Nance Garner, F.D.R.’s vice president,
who famously described the office as “not worth a bucket of warm spit.”
Caro paints a vivid picture of L.B.J.’s misery. We can feel Johnson’s
ambition ebb, and believe with him that his political life was over, as
he was shut out of meetings, unwelcome on Air Force One, mistrusted and
despised by Robert Kennedy. While in Congress he may not have been
universally admired among the Washington elite, and was even mocked by
them as a bit of a rube. But he had certainly never been pitied.
In the White House, he invented reasons to come to the outskirts of the
Oval Office in the mornings, where he was rarely welcome, and made sure
his presence was noted by Kennedy’s staff. Even if they did not respect
him, he wasn’t going to let anyone forget him.
Then tragedy changed everything. Within hours of President Kennedy’s
assassination, Johnson was sworn in as president, without the pomp of an
inauguration, but with all the powers of the office. At first he was
careful in wielding them. He didn’t move into the Oval Office for days,
running the executive branch from Room 274 in the Executive Office
Building. The family didn’t move into the White House residence until
Dec. 7. But soon enough, it would become clear that the power Johnson
had grasped for his entire life was finally his.
As Caro shows in this and his preceding volumes, power ultimately
reveals character. For L.B.J., becoming president freed him to embrace
parts of his past that, for political or other reasons, had remained
under wraps. Suddenly there was no longer a reason to dissociate himself
from the poverty and failure of his childhood. Power released the
source of Johnson’s humanity.
Last year I was privileged to speak at the funeral of Sargent Shriver — a
man who served L.B.J. but who in many ways was his temperamental
opposite. I said then that too many of us spend too much time worrying
about advancement or personal gain at the expense of effort. We might
fail, but we need to get caught trying. That was Shriver’s great virtue. With Johnson’s election he actually had the chance to try and to win.
Even as Barry Goldwater was midwifing the antigovernment movement that
would grow to such dominance decades later, L.B.J., Shriver and other
giants of the civil rights and antipoverty movements seemed to rise all
around me as I was beginning my political involvement. They believed
government had an essential part to play in expanding civil rights and
reducing poverty and inequality. It soon became clear that hearts needed to be changed, along with laws. Not just Congress, but the American people themselves needed to be got to.
It was hard to do, absent a crisis like the losses of President Kennedy,
Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy. By the late 1960s, America’s
increasing involvement and frustration in Vietnam, the rise of more
militant civil rights leaders and riots in many cities, and the end of
broad-based economic growth that had indeed “lifted all boats” in the
early ’60s, made it harder and harder to win more converts to the civil
rights and antipoverty causes.
But for a few brief years, Lyndon Johnson, once a fairly conventional
Southern Democrat, constrained by his constituents and his overriding
hunger for power, rose above his political past and personal
limitations, to embrace and promote his boyhood dreams of opportunity
and equality for all Americans. After all the years of striving for
power, once he had it, he said to the American people, “I’ll let you in
on a secret — I mean to use it.” And use it he did to pass the Civil
Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, the open housing law, the antipoverty
legislation, Medicare and Medicaid, Head Start and much more.
He knew what the presidency was for: to get to people — to members of
Congress, often with tricks up his sleeve; to the American people, by
wearing his heart on his sleeve.
Even when we parted company over the Vietnam War, I never hated L.B.J.
the way many young people of my generation came to. I couldn’t. What he
did to advance civil rights and equal opportunity was too important. I
remain grateful to him. L.B.J. got to me, and after all these years, he
still does. With this fascinating and meticulous account of how and why
he did it, Robert Caro has once again done America a great service.
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